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Abstract 
Using the 2009 and 2014 European Election Studies (EES), we explore the effect of the economy on the vote in the 2009 
and 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections. The paper demonstrates that the economy did influence voters in both 
contests. However, its impact was heterogeneous across the two elections and between countries. While assessments 
of the economy directly motivated voters in 2009 by 2014 economic appraisals were conditioned by how much respon-
sibility voters felt the national government had for the state of the economy, implying a shift in calculus between the 
two elections. The analysis suggests that voters in 2009 were simply reacting to the economic tsunami that was the 
Global Financial Crisis, with motivations primarily driven by the unfavourable economic conditions countries faced. But 
in 2014, evaluations were conditioned by judgments about responsibility for the economy, suggesting a more conscious 
holding to account of the government. Our paper also reveals cross-country differences in the influence of the economy 
on vote. Attribution of responsibility and economic evaluations had a more potent impact on support for the govern-
ment in bailout countries compared to non-bailout countries in 2014. Our findings demonstrate the importance of 
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1. Introduction 
Between 2008 and 2014 the advanced industrial world 
faced its greatest economic challenge since the Great 
Depression of the late 1920s. The Global Financial Cri-
sis (GFC) saw unemployment across the European Un-
ion (EU) rise to unprecedented levels, prolonged peri-
ods of negative economic growth, a series of banks 
come close to collapse forcing national and EU institu-
tions to step in and preserve them, national deficits 
spiral, and the true indebtedness of many EU member 
states become evident. Such were the scale of eco-
nomic problems that serious questions were raised re-
garding the ability of the Euro currency to survive (e.g. 
Eichengreen, 2013; Hotten, 2011). Eight member states 
(Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, 
Romania and Spain) were forced to seek so-called 
‘bailouts’ between 2008 and 2013, where the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU provided fi-
nances to these countries to enable them to keep their 
ships of state afloat. Support came with the proviso 
that these countries would implement a series of aus-
tere economic measures, including salary cuts and re-
duced public services. Austerity became the economic 
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orthodoxy of most member states with the GFC also 
having a number of political repercussions including 
the ejection from office of many governments in power 
at the time the GFC hit (LeDuc & Pammett, 2013), the 
development of new anti-establishment political 
movements across Europe, and a dampening of enthu-
siasm towards the EU (Treib, 2014). Taken together, all 
of this ensured the economy has been the dominant 
preoccupation of both citizens and governments alike 
over the past eight years and in this context, it is rea-
sonable to assume economics has been a key issue, if 
not the key issue, on voters’ minds as they went to the 
ballot box during this period. 
Previous studies have shown the potency of the 
economy on the vote (e.g. Dassonneville & Lewis-Beck, 
2014; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 
2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2013). During economic 
crises, the economy becomes even more salient (Das-
sonneville & Lewis-Beck, 2014; Singer, 2011), as the 
media gives greater coverage to the issue (Soroka, 
2006). This is evidenced by the fact economics were 
front and centre in the recent national elections of 
countries adversely affected by the GFC (e.g. Costa-
Lobo, 2013; Fraile & Lewis-Beck, 2013; Marsh & Mi-
khaylov, 2014; Nezi, 2012; Nezi & Katsanidou, 2014). 
Economics have also been shown to shape attitudes 
towards European integration (e.g. Gabel, 1998; Tuck-
er, Pacek, & Berinsky, 2002) and preferences in EU ref-
erendums (e.g. Doyle & Fidrmuc, 2006; Elkink, Quinlan, 
& Sinnott, 2015). However, its influence on vote choice 
in European Parliament elections has been explored 
much less. Traditionally, EP elections have been consid-
ered ‘second-order’, with voter behaviour conditioned 
by attitudes to the incumbent government (e.g. Hix & 
Marsh, 2011; Marsh, 1998; Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt 
& Teperoglou, 2015). More recently, there has been an 
appreciation that other reasons also influence voters in 
EP contests (e.g. de Vries, van der Brug, van Egmond, & 
van der Eijk, 2011; Hobolt & Spoon, 2012). Our claim is 
that economics are another crucial component, especial-
ly in light of the Global Financial Crisis. Therefore, our 
paper focuses on how the economy motivated vote 
choice in the 2009 and 2014 European elections. 
There has never been a more apt time to explore 
the motivations underlying citizen behaviour in EP elec-
tions given the increasing powers of the European Par-
liament (Hix, 2013; Hobolt, 2014). EP elections are 
among the few means citizens have to pass judgment 
on the EU and thus, exploring what motivates voters in 
these contests is valuable. Studying behaviour in Euro-
pean elections is all the more interesting considering 
the 2014 elections marked an attempt by the EU to 
make European elections “different” from previous EP 
contests by introducing spitzenkandidaten, where par-
ties at the European level proposed rival candidates for 
the Presidency of the European Commission. It was 
hoped by offering voters the opportunity of voting for 
an executive office and providing a link between voter 
preferences and selection of the Commission might 
create more interest in the elections and add a greater 
‘European’ dimension to contests that have been clas-
sically characterised as ‘second-order’ (Hobolt, 2014). 
However, if vote choice is motivated by attitudes to the 
national economy as we suspect, this would undermine 
the idea that European elections were anything but 
elections where voters were motivated by domestic 
matters. Accordingly, assessing the influence of the na-
tional economy on vote is relevant. Additionally, few 
studies of EP elections have focused on the link be-
tween economics and vote (for an exception see Tilley, 
Garry, & Bold, 2008) and those that have done have 
done so through the prism of the ‘second-order’ model 
and in periods of general economic calm. But the 2009 
and 2014 contests where held in the midst and after-
math of the Crisis. Couple this with the prominent role 
European institutions have played in shaping member 
states responses to the GFC, there is merit in re-
assessing its impact in these circumstances. 
We develop a set of expectations about how the 
economy influenced vote choice in the 2009 and 2014 
EP elections. In line with previous scholarship which has 
highlighted the importance of context (e.g. Anderson, 
2000; Powell Jnr. & Whitten, 1993; Whitten & Palmer, 
1999), we argue the impact of economy on vote is het-
erogeneous across both elections and countries. We ex-
pect that in 2009 economic perceptions directly influ-
enced vote as the poll took place as the GFC was taking 
root and the effects were only becoming obvious. It also 
offered the first opportunity for most European citizens 
to have their say at the ballot box in a national contest, 
and thus a direct link is anticipated. By 2014, we expect 
the economy still influences vote but voter calculus 
might have shifted. We suggest voters’ economic as-
sessments will be conditioned by how much responsibil-
ity for economic performance they attribute to the na-
tional government. Building on a large literature that 
shows voter ascriptions of responsibility matter (e.g. de 
Vries, Edwards, & Tilman, 2011; Hellwig & Coffey, 2011; 
Marsh & Tilley, 2009; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011), we expect 
this change of calculus to be driven by a mixture of fac-
tors including that governments in power at the time of 
the GFC hit had been dismissed in many countries 
(LeDuc & Pammett, 2013), the initial shock of the GFC 
had dissipated with voters now well accustomed to the 
economic realities post-crisis, and voters by this point 
were now adjudicating on their government’s response 
to the economic crisis, as much as responding to the 
economic context themselves. Thus, we expect the more 
a government is perceived to be responsible for economic 
performance, the stronger economic voting will be. 
Our third expectation relates exclusively to the 
2014 elections. We posit the impact of the economy on 
the vote might vary between countries based on 
whether a state received external financial aid or not in 
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the preceding six years. The reasoning is simple—
bailout and non-bailout countries had different econom-
ic experiences with the crisis more pronounced in the 
former compared with the latter, with ‘bailout states’ 
having been more constrained as they were subject to 
scrutiny from external institutions. Consequently, we 
suggest the impact of economics on vote in 2014 will 
be more potent in countries that received a bailout. 
Using a series of multivariate models based on data 
from the 2009 and 2014 European Election Study (EES), 
our expectations are largely borne out. Our analysis ad-
vances our understanding of economic voting and Euro-
pean elections in numerous ways. First, we demonstrate 
that during the economic crisis and its aftermath, eco-
nomic perceptions played an important role in deter-
mining vote in the European Elections, challenging pre-
vious research suggesting economic voting in EP 
contests were minimal (Tilley et al., 2008). Second, we 
show economic perceptions influence on vote in EP elec-
tions are conditional on context, with perceptions being 
a direct motivator of vote choice in 2009 but economic 
assessments impact on vote conditioned by ascriptions 
of responsibility in 2014. This highlights the extent to 
which economic voting, while robust and clearly evi-
dent, is conditioned by context. Third, the idea that the 
2014 EP elections were any different from past Euro-
pean elections is severely undermined. Clearly, EP elec-
tions retain a distinct and strong national flavour. 
We structure our article as follows: we begin by re-
viewing the economic voting literature, defining our 
conception of economic voting, and then developing 
three hypotheses to test its impact on vote in the 2009 
and 2014 EP elections. In section 3, we describe our re-
search strategy and data. Section 4 details our empiri-
cal results while section 5 provides a summary of our 
results and their implications. 
2. Theory 
2.1. Defining the Mechanisms of Economic Voting in EP 
Elections 
“It’s the economy, stupid!”—the phrase coined by Bill 
Clinton’s campaign team during his run for the Ameri-
can Presidency in 1992 stresses the importance political 
campaigns credit to the economy’s impact on voters. 
And they do not appear to be wrong for the economy 
has been shown to influence vote time and again cross-
nationally (e.g. Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck & 
Stegmaier, 2013; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Lewis-
Beck, Nadeau, & Elias, 2008; Singer, 2011). Economic 
voting comes in three forms: valence, positional, and 
patrimonial (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, & Foucault, 2013). 
Traditionally, the valence model has gained most atten-
tion and is based on the premise that when voters con-
sider the economy to be doing well, they are more likely 
to vote for the government, and conversely, when it is 
perceived to be underperforming, they are more likely 
to vote against them. This reward-punishment axiom 
has led Anderson (2007, p. 277) to note that “given citi-
zens limited willingness and capacity to process complex 
information about politics, rewards and punishment 
should most easily be detectable with regard to the per-
formance of the economy—after all, the economy is 
perhaps the most perennially talked-about issue”. The 
economy is especially likely to be salient during an eco-
nomic crisis (Dassonneville & Lewis-Beck, 2014; Singer, 
2011). If we couple this with the fact that ideologically 
motivated voting has been declining, fewer citizens now 
have a predisposition to vote for a particular party (e.g. 
Dalton, 2006), and valence issues are more prominent 
than ever (e.g. Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 
2009), we expect the economy will impact vote. 
While an abundance of literature suggests a strong 
link between economy and vote, critics argue partisan 
bias heavily distorts voters’ economic perceptions. In 
the words of Bartels (2002, p.138) “partisan loyalties 
have pervasive effects on perceptions of the political 
world”. Thus, some scholars (e.g. Evans & Anderson, 
2006; Wlezien, Franklin, & Twiggs, 1997) have con-
tended political predispositions contaminate attitudes 
towards the economy and that economic assessments 
have no independent effect of their own. Assertions of 
endogeneity have been met with vigorous counter-
claims that even when it can be fully teased out (for 
example using panel data and an instrumental variable 
approach), there is persuasive evidence to showing 
economics have a direct effect on vote, and if anything, 
cross-sectional analysis may suppress the true impact 
of economic voting (e.g. Fraile & Lewis-Beck, 2014; 
Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, & Elias, 2008). Our room for 
manoeuver in this analysis is limited as we only have 
access to cross-sectional data. However, we are 
buoyed by scholarship that shows even when endoge-
neity concerns can be conclusively addressed, the 
strong impact of economy on vote persists. As means 
of allaying concerns to the extent we can, we do con-
trol for partisanship in our models and do draw infer-
ences across two cross-sectional samples rather than 
one. While not circumventing the endogeneity issue 
completely, this does allow us to have greater confi-
dence in our conclusions than we otherwise might. 
Much debate also rages about the mechanisms un-
derlying economic voting. Existing research recognizes 
two different facets. First is whether voters are moti-
vated by sociotropic or egocentric rationales, and sec-
ond whether voters base their opinions on retrospec-
tive or prospective judgments. We deal with each in 
turn below. 
Sociotropic motivations assume voters act accord-
ing to their perception of the overall macroeconomic 
situation in their country while egocentric motivations 
are predicated on ‘personal’ utility with voters deciding 
on the basis of their personal economic gain or loss 
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(Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). While we do not discount 
the possibility some voters in EP elections might be ego-
centric, we suspect most are motivated by sociotropic 
utility. We come to this view not only because most re-
search suggests sociotropic considerations drive eco-
nomic voting more (e.g. Anderson, 2000; Lewis-Beck & 
Stegmaier, 2013), but also because of the nature of EP 
contests. As elections are taking place simultaneously 
across the EU, we suspect benchmarking (Kayser & Per-
ess, 2012) is more likely to take hold, where citizens 
compare the economic performance of their countries 
to others, and in doing so, are more likely to be making 
sociotropic rather than pocketbook comparisons. In any 
event, our measure of economic performance only al-
lows us to explore sociotropic motivations. 
Another area of debate is whether voters base their 
judgments on retrospective or prospective evaluations. 
Retrospective assessments assume voters’ decisions 
are based on the past performance of the government 
and follow the premise that politicians are held ac-
countable for their actions (Woon, 2012). On the other 
hand, such an assumption is incompatible with the idea 
that voters are forward-looking (e.g. Ashworth & Bue-
no de Mesquita, 2008; Gordon & Huber, 2007). Conse-
quently, many argue that when casting a vote, the 
electorate are thinking about how politicians will han-
dle the economy in the future (Woon, 2012). Besides 
the stronger evidence of retrospective voting (e.g. 
Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2013), we assume that the characteristics of EP elec-
tions, particularly those of 2009 and 2014, makes ret-
rospective voting much more likely. Voters in EP elec-
tions are not voting for a government and 
consequently are unlikely to judge the prospect of fu-
ture economic dividends accruing from the election of 
individuals to the European Parliament, especially as 
the EU’s economic power is distributed across a range 
of institutions from the Commission to the European 
Central Bank.1 In sum, we expect economic voting in EP 
elections to be sociotropic and retrospective. 
2.2. Economic Voting in the European Parliament 
Elections of 2009 and 2014 
Our interest lies in deciphering the impact of the econ-
omy on vote in the 2009 and 2014 European elections. 
Traditionally European elections have been studied 
from the ‘second-order’ perspective with vote choice 
considered to be primarily influenced by attitudes to 
the incumbent government (e.g. Hix & Marsh, 2011; 
                                                          
1 While the 2014 EP elections were predicated on the idea of 
citizens being able to vote for an executive office, we maintain 
this was not equivalent to voting for a government because 
while the EP election results are taken into account in the se-
lection of the Commission President, selection of Commission-
ers remains the purview of national governments. 
Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005). In recent years, 
other reasons beyond ‘second-order’ stimuli such as 
attitudes towards integration and citizens level of so-
phistication have been shown to influence voters as 
well (e.g. de Vries, van der Brug, van Egmond, & van 
der Eijk, 2011; Hobolt & Spoon, 2012). Nonetheless, EP 
elections continue to have a ‘second-order’ dimension, 
with elections campaigns dominated by domestic is-
sues, low voter turnout, and established parties and in-
cumbent governments losing votes (e.g. Cordero & 
Montero, 2015; Quinlan & Okolikj, 2016; Schmitt & 
Teperoglou, 2015). Accordingly, we would expect to 
find support for valence economic voting in EP elec-
tions with voters judging government performance on 
a domestic issue (the national economy). 
Yet few studies have explored economic voting in 
EP elections. A notable exception is Tilley et al.’s (2008) 
analysis of economic voting in the 2004 contest. They 
concluded economic voting was limited and only ob-
servable among sophisticated voters and in countries 
that had single party governments in power. A more 
comprehensive assessment of economic voting using 
European election data comes from van der Brug, van 
der Eijk, and Franklin (2007). Using data from the Euro-
pean Election Studies between 1989 and 1999, they 
found that while the economy matters it is just one 
factor among many that influences vote. Further, its 
impact depends on its saliency as an issue, leading 
them to conclude that while the economy matters, its 
impact is not quite as important as we might have as-
sumed. However, a re-assessment of the economy’s 
impact on vote in EP elections is in order considering 
the GFC, which has put the economy front and centre 
of political debate since 2008 and seen EU institutions 
take a prominent role in dealing with the fallout from 
the Crisis. Given these circumstances, it can be ex-
pected the economy might have influenced vote choice 
to a greater extent in 2009 and 2014. 
But how might the economy have shaped vote in 
2009 and 2014? An abundance of research has previ-
ously demonstrated that context conditions economic 
voting (e.g. Anderson, 2000; Powell Jnr. & Whitten, 
1993). We suppose context will also mediate the im-
pact of economy in EP elections too and that its influ-
ence will vary across both elections and countries. Let 
us first take the differences between 2009 and 2014 
polls. We suspect economic perceptions will have di-
rectly influenced vote in 2009 considering that the Cri-
sis was still evolving, with the ramifications of the GFC 
only becoming gradually clear. The fallout consumed 
voters as unemployment rose, GDP declined, member 
states debt levels increased, and significant majorities 
of citizens across the Union judged their national eco-
nomic circumstances as poor (see Figure 1). The 2009 
EP elections also represented the first opportunity for 
most voters to pass judgment on the Crisis in nation-
wide elections. Of the twenty-seven member states, 
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only in Lithuania had voters been to the polls since the 
GFC’s critical tipping point of September 2008.2 Given 
these circumstances, we expect economic perceptions 
directly influenced vote in 2009. 
We infer that the economy still matters in 2014 but 
as the contextual circumstances were different at this 
point, we posit voter calculus will have shifted. By this 
stage, six years had elapsed since the GFC took hold 
and while many countries were still dealing with the 
fallout from it, the global economy had stabilized to an 
extent. In many member states, the economic outlook 
was looking better both at a macro level and in terms 
of citizen perceptions (for e.g. see Figure 2). Further-
more, many governments in power when the Crisis 
took hold had been dismissed. Thus, while we still ex-
pect economic perceptions to matter, we expect voters 
will take a wider view and incorporate how responsible 
they felt the government to be for the economic cir-
cumstances in 2014. A large literature has highlighted 
that ascriptions of responsibility matter (e.g. de Vries, 
Edwards, & Tilman, 2011; Hellwig & Coffey, 2011; Ho-
bolt & Tilley, 2014; Marsh & Tilley, 2009; Powell Jnr. & 
Whitten, 1993). We contend responsibility attribution 
matters in 2014 because voters will have had time to 
absorb the shock of the GFC, and having already dis-
missed many governments in power at the time of the 
GFC, evaluations of new governments’ handling of the 
                                                          
2 While the active phase of the GFC can be dated to early 2007, 
September 2008 remains an important crunch point in its evo-
lution with the collapse of Lehman Brothers Bank in the United 
States and inter-bank lending seizing up, triggering a global 
economic shock which resulted in a number of European banks 
failing, stock indexes plummeting, and governments being 
forced to intervene in the economy in unprecedented ways. 
economy should become more prominent. Hence, we 
expect perceptions of economic responsibility (PER) will 
matter in 2014, and that they will condition economic 
voting. The more responsibility voters credit to the gov-
ernment for the economy, the more likely they are to 
vote for/against them, depending on whether they as-
sess the economy to be performing good or bad. 
Two critiques might be levelled at our suppositions. 
The first relates to the methodological issue of restrict-
ed variance regarding individual economic perceptions. 
Given the devestating effects of the GFC, there is an 
expectation that as everybody thought the economy 
was performing badly, at least in 2009, there might be 
little variation to explore (for more see Fraile & Lewis-
Beck, 2014). However, inspection of citizens’ views 
about economic performance at the time shows a 
more nuanced picture. Figures 1 and 2 detail the distri-
bution of economic perceptions by country. In 2009 
(Figure 1) sufficient numbers of citizens in most mem-
ber states had an alternative view to the conventional 
wisdom that the economy was performing poorly, alt-
hough in some countries this respresented a small pro-
portion of the electorate. Our cross-national strategy 
aids us here as with evaluations varying between coun-
tries, there is suficient variance overall to explore eco-
nomic perceptions legitimately. Thus, we do not be-
lieve the restricted variance problem is something that 
plagues our analysis to a sufficient extent. Additionally, 
these distributions support our idea that as voter per-
ceptions of the economy have changed between 2009 
and 2014 (which inspection of Figures 1 and 2 by coun-
try illustrate they clearly have), this might play into 
economic voting being different between the two elec-
tions and between countries. 
 
Figure 1. Perceptions of the economy by country in 2009 (%). Source: van Egmond, van der Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & 
Sapir, 2013. Note: Data ordered by proportion of respondents saying “worse”. 
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Figure 2. Perceptions of the economy by country in 2014 (%). Source: Schmitt, Popa, & Devinger, 2015.Note: Data or-
dered by proportion of respondents saying “worse”. 
The second critique is our focus on attributions of re-
sponsibility by voters. Critics suggest they might be 
contaminated by pre-existing political views (e.g. Bis-
gaard, 2015; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). An alternative 
strategy might have been to look at responsibility de-
lineation from an aggregate perspective using an in-
dex based on institutional criteria including a coun-
try’s electoral and party system, majority status of 
government, and opposition influence, as previous 
work has done (e.g. Anderson, 2000; Powell Jnr. & 
Whitten, 1993). However, this assumption requires us 
to believe voters have detailed information as to how 
the political system operates and where the responsi-
bility for power really lies, which is debatable. In any 
event and in the vein of many other studies (e.g.: Ho-
bolt & Tilley, 2014; Marsh & Tilley, 2009; Sanders, 
2000), we believe subjective perceptions are key. 
Controlling for the respondent’s ideological distance 
from the ideological position of the party of the incum-
bent head of government on the left-right scale cir-
cumvents this problem to an extent. Further, we are 
buoyed by Lavine, Johnston and Steenbergen’s (2012) 
work showing ambivalent partisans—voters who can 
suspend their partiality, do exist, and that these vot-
ers judge based on evidence. We also know suspension 
of partisanship is all the more likely to occur when 
there is sizeable consensus on an issue, such as a se-
vere economic crisis (Parker-Stephen, 2013; Stanig, 
2013) or when economic conditions are improving. 
Thus, while we accept that our measure is not ideal 
and thus a caveat to our conclusions, we are confident 
the issue is not as problematic as might first appear. 
In sum, our expectations can be summarized as 
follows: 
H1: Economic assessments will directly influence 
vote choice in the 2009 EP elections. 
H2: Voter attributions of responsibility to the 
national government for economic performance 
will condition the impact of economic assessments 
on vote choice in the 2014 EP elections. 
We also expect the impact of the economy on vote 
choice in 2014 to vary by country. Specifically, we as-
sume economic voting might differ between bailout and 
non-bailout countries. We classify ‘bailout’ countries as 
EU member states that received external financial assis-
tance to avert sovereign defaults between 2008 and 
2012. Eight states fall into this category: Cyprus, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Spain.3 
Our supposition is the economic crises in bailout coun-
tries have been markedly worse compared to non-
bailout countries and the consequences felt much more 
profoundly, especially as bailout countries were subject 
to much more stringent austerity measures, with their 
government’s economic decisions were under external 
scrutiny from institutions like the EU and the IMF. 
Table 1 contrasts the positions of the two sets of 
countries on four prominent indicators of economic 
                                                          
3 Our choice is based on those countries that received any 
EU/IMF financial assistance. Italy, although often considered as 
party of this group, was not officially in receipt of a formal 
bailout. An advantage of our classification is that we incorpo-
rate all member states adjudged to be in such financial peril 
that they needed external financial assistance, and not concen-
trated solely on the states of Southern Europe, which have re-
ceived most scholarly attention to date (e.g. Lewis-Beck & 
Nadeau, 2012; Schmitt & Teperoglou, 2015). 
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performance for the year 2014. As we can see, the 
eight countries who received external financial assis-
tance performed significantly worse on average on 
three indicators: unemployment, youth unemploy-
ment, and government debt as a percentage of GDP. 
Only for economic growth are the bailout and non-
bailout countries similar in performance. But if we re-
move the extreme outlier among the bailout countries 
for 2014, namely Ireland which recorded economic 
growth of 5.2% in 2014, the difference is much greater 
(1.34% growth for bailout countries versus 1.93% for 
non-bailout countries). In sum, there is clear evidence 
to suggest sizeable differences in economic perfor-
mance between the two sets of countries and this 
might play into how economics influenced vote in the 
2014 EP elections. Thus we suggest that: 
H3: Economic assessments and voter attributions of 
responsibility for economic performance will have a 
greater impact on vote choice in the 2014 EP 
elections in countries that have received bailouts 
from external bodies compared to those who have 
not. 
Table 1. Selected economic conditions in bailout versus 
non-bailout countries in 2014. 
 Bailout Non-Bailout 
Unemployment 15.43% 8.55% 
Youth unemployment 33.41% 19.39% 
Economic growth 1.83% 1.93% 
General Government Gross 
debt as a percentage of GDP 
97.58% 62.96% 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on classification of 
bailout versus non-bailout countries on data gathered 
from Eurostat and World Bank. 
3. Research Strategy 
3.1. Data and Primary Variable Classifications 
Our data comes from the 2009 (van Egmond, van der 
Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & Sapir, 2013) and 2014 
(Schmitt, Popa, & Devinger, 2015) European Electoral 
Studies (EES), two cross-sectional comparative post-
election surveys administered in all EU member states. 
The data includes identical questions posed to re-
spondents that tap voters’ assessments of the econo-
my, who they perceive to be responsible for it, as well 
as other relevant political and demographic variables. 
Our dependent variable is binary and captures 
whether a respondent voted for the national governing 
party/coalition (coded 1) or another party/coalition 
(coded 0) on the basis of the question: “Which party 
did you give your vote to in these recent European Par-
liament elections?” Respondents who reported ab-
staining were excluded from the analysis.4 
We have two primary independent variables. The 
first is perceptions of economic performance. Our 
measure is sociotropic and retrospective and is based on 
the question: “Compared to 12 months ago, do you 
think that the general economic situation in [our coun-
try] is…” In common with previous studies of economic 
voting, we recoded this measure into a binary variable, 
with a 1 capturing those who rated the economy as “Is a 
lot better” and “Is a little better” and 0 representing re-
spondents who said “Is a little worse” and “Is a lot 
worse”.5 Our second independent variable of interest is 
responsibility attribution for the national economy. We 
capture this with responses to the question: “thinking 
about the economy, how responsible is [incumbent] 
government for economic conditions in [our country]”. 
We refer to this as perceptions of economic responsibil-
ity (PER), which is scaled from 0 to 10, with a score of 0 
indicating a voter does not hold the government respon-
sible for the economy and a score of 10 representing 
voters who deemed the government fully responsible. 
Our total N at the micro level across the two election 
cycles is 26,728 observations: 19,878 for the 2009 elec-
tions and 6,850 for the 2014 EP elections, with all coun-
try samples across both waves having a minimum of 
1,000 initial observations and being representative of 
the national population. The difference in number of ob-
servation between 2009 and 2014 sample is a result of 
fewer observations available in 2014 and due to our 
classifications.6 Our macro observations are 27 for both 
elections.7 
                                                          
4 For robustness, we re-classified our dependent variable to in-
clude the party of the incumbent Head of Government. We 
identified no substantive deviations, with the alternative mod-
els in line with our theoretical expectations. The alternative 
specifications are detailed in Table A7 in Appendix. 
5Respondents who answered “stayed the same” and “don’t 
know” were excluded from the analysis. For robustness, we re-
classified this variable by including those who responded 
“stayed the same” in both the “worse” and the “better” cate-
gories and re-estimating our models on this basis (see Tables 
A5 and A6 in Appendix). Regarding the inclusion of “stayed the 
same” in the “worse” category, which we argue is the most 
appropriate specification given the economic crisis, we identi-
fied no substantive deviations, with the alternative models in 
line with our theoretical expectations. When the “stayed the 
same” is included among the “better” category, we do see that 
the coefficient for the interaction term in 2014 is statistically 
significant only at p<0.1. While a slight deviation on our re-
ported analysis, it does not go against our theoretical expecta-
tions.  
6 This is a result of the many respondents who answered that 
economy “stayed the same” in 2014 Also, a larger number of 
respondents refused to answer for which party they gave their 
vote in 2014 EP election. 
7 Croatia is excluded from the analysis to maintain comparabil-
ity at the macro level as the country only became a member of 
the EU in 2013 and thus only participated in the 2014 elections. 
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3.2. Modelling Strategy and Covariate Selection 
The hierarchical nature of the EES data calls for a multi-
level strategy. When observations within a sample are 
clustered, the data violates the assumption of inde-
pendence of observations. Failure to take account of 
this could result in the incorrect estimation of standard 
errors, which can increase the probability of Type-I er-
rors (Gelman & Hill, 2007). Multilevel modeling allows 
us to estimate separate variance components for both 
the micro and macro levels. For this study, we define 
two levels of analysis: citizens (micro-level) that are 
nested in countries (macro-level).8 We estimate multi-
level models with random effects for country and 
economy, as we expect the impact of economy will 
vary between countries. 
We face difficulties in taking a multilevel approach 
in testing H3: the difference between bailout and non-
bailout countries in terms of economy’s impact on vote 
in the 2014 elections. With bailout countries only ac-
counting for eight observations, a multilevel approach 
is infeasible because multilevel models with an inade-
quate number of macro observations have been noted 
for producing biased estimates (e.g.Maas & Hox, 2004; 
Stegmueller, 2013). One might assume we would cir-
cumvent this by estimating a multilevel (or indeed sim-
ple logit) model by just including a three-way interac-
tion in our model. However, given the noted difficulties 
in interpreting interactions in logit models (Brambor, 
Roberts Clarke, & Golder, 2006), we suggest a three-
way interaction is too convoluted and a more compre-
hensive interpretation is achieved from this strategy. 
Accordingly, Models V and VI in Table 3 are based on 
regular logit models with robust standard errors. 
The remainder of our model is based on the well-
established specification for testing economic effects in 
a comparative analysis (e.g. Duch & Stevenson, 2008; 
Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2012). Therefore, we control for 
religious service attendance as a proxy of cleavage and 
ideology. Our ideological measure captures the ideo-
logical distance of the respondent from the ideological 
position of the party of the incumbent head of gov-
ernment on the left-right scale.9 To this, we add the in-
                                                                                           
For robustness, each model was re-estimated omitting each 
individual country to establish if a specific country was driving 
our results. We identified no substantive deviations, with the 
alternative models in line with our theoretical expectations. 
8 We also estimated our models in the classic pooled analysis 
fashion and we identified no substantive deviations from our 
theoretical expectations. 
9 We calculated ideology-distance variable as follows: we took 
the mean of respondents’ placements of the head of govern-
ment party on a left-right scale for each country and each elec-
tion. Then we subtracted this mean from the individual re-
spondent’s self-placement on the left-right scale and took the 
absolute value of the results, which created the ideological dis-
tance variable. 
teraction term10 between economic evaluations and 
perceptions of government responsibility in line with 
our theoretical expectations, to arrive at the following 
model: 
Vote = f (Cleavage, ideological distance, economy * 
perceptions of government responsibility) 
Summary statistics for each variable are included in the 
appendix (see Tables A2–A4). 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. First we 
are interested in establishing the direct effect of evalua-
tions of the economy on vote choice. Models I (2009) 
and II (2014) of Table 2 test this. Second we add an in-
teraction component to the basic model to test our sec-
ond hypothesis—our expectation being the impact of 
the economy on vote might be mediated by how much 
responsibility is attributed to the national government 
for economic performance. We expect to observe het-
erogeneity between the elections—i.e. perceptions of 
economic responsibility will mediate the impact of 
economy on vote in 2014 but not in 2009. Models III 
(2009) and IV (2014) of Table 2 investigates this. Third, 
we explore whether the impact of economy and respon-
sibility attribution is the same in 2014 between coun-
tries. We assume different effects will take hold in bailout 
compared to non-bailout states, with economy and the 
interaction between economy and responsibility attribu-
tion having a stronger impact in bailout states. We test 
this in Models V (bailout) and VI (non bailout) of Table 3. 
In models I and II of Table 2, we see the economy 
variable is positive and statically significant in both 
models (p<0.01). This suggests that for respondents 
who judge the economy has improved in their country 
in the preceding twelve months before the election, 
the likelihood of voting for the government increased 
substantially. Such an effect is hardly surprising and 
confirms the potency of economics in shaping vote, 
even in a second-order election like the EP elections. 
 
                                                          
10 It should be noted that the magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance of interaction effects in models with binary dependent 
variables can vary by observation (Ai & Norton, 2003). As a ro-
bustness check, we estimated the interaction effects following 
Norton, Wang and Ai (2004) and observed no significant devia-
tions from our reported analysis. 
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Table 2: Multilevel logit models examining the impact of economic voting in 27 democracies. Source: van Egmond, van 
der Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & Sapir, 2013; Schmitt, Popa, & Devinger, 2015. 
Dependent variable: Vote for the 
Incumbent Party or Coalition  
(I) 
2009 
(II) 
2014 
(III) 
2009 
(IV) 
2014 
FIXED EFFECTS     
Economy 0.712** 
(0.113) 
1.191** 
(0.209) 
0.796** 
(0.18) 
0.688* 
(0.268) 
PER - - -0.036** 
(0.007) 
-0.039** 
(0.015) 
Ideology–distance -0.271** 
(0.01) 
-0.055** 
(0.014) 
-0.273** 
(0.011) 
-0.057** 
(0.014) 
Religion -0.114** 
(0.012) 
-0.05* 
(0.021) 
-0.118** 
(0.013) 
-0.048* 
(0.021) 
Economy x PER - - -0.014 
(0.021) 
0.066** 
(0.022) 
Constant -0.08 
(0.129) 
-0.424* 
(0.181) 
0.202 
(0.139) 
-0.131 
(0.213) 
RANDOM EFFECTS     
(Intercept) Country 0.233 
(0.483) 
0.051 
(0.225) 
0.234 
(0.484) 
0.056 
(0.237) 
(Intercept) Economy by Country 0.119 
(0.345) 
0.521 
(0.722) 
0.115 
(0.339) 
0.511 
(0.715) 
N (Micro/Macro) 19878/27 6850/27 19498/27 6790/27 
Log Likelihood -10254.8 -4229.7 -10025 -4185.8 
AIC 20521.7 8471.3 20066 8387.6 
BIC 20569.1 8512.3 20129 8442.2 
Note: Standard error in parenthesis; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
Table 3 Logit models examining the impact of economic voting in 27 democracies in the 2014 European Parliament 
elections. Source: Schmitt, Popa, & Devinger, 2015. 
Dependent variable: Vote for the 
Incumbent Party or Coalition 
(V) 
2014 (Bailout) 
(VI) 
2014 (Non bailout) 
Economy 0.402 
(0.344) 
-0.062 
(0.19) 
PER -0.132** 
(0.029) 
-0.02 
(0.015) 
Ideology–distance 0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.093** 
(0.014) 
Religion -0.138** 
(0.038) 
-0.028 
(0.02) 
Economy x PER 0.137** 
(0.041) 
0.078** 
(0.023) 
Constant 0.545 
(0.3) 
0.118 
(0.154) 
N 1712 5078 
Log Likelihood -1.024 -3.437.6 
AIC 2.060 6.887.2 
Note: Robust standard error in parenthesis; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
However, our supposition is the ‘true impact’ of econo-
my only reveals itself when perceptions of responsibility 
for economic performance (PER) are accounted for. 
Therefore, we add an interaction term to our models. 
We detail the results in models III and IV of Table 2. It is 
evident that the inclusion of responsibility attribution 
and the interaction with economic assessments re-
sults in some important changes. First, PER on its own 
has an influence in both elections. In both 2009 and 
2014, the more citizens thought the economy was the 
responsibility of the government, the more likely they 
were to vote against the government, hardly surprising 
given the economic circumstances in many states. Sec-
ond, the strong direct effect of economic perceptions on 
vote persists: the more voters thought the economy was 
performing well (incidentally few did), the more likely 
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they were to vote for the incumbent administration, and 
this effect remains independent of responsibility attribu-
tion. However, the interaction term in 2009 does not 
reach statistical significance.11 This is in line with our ex-
pectations—economic perceptions were the primary 
driver of economic voting in the 2009 poll. 
We see a different pattern for 2014 (Model IV). 
Here, the addition of attributions of responsibility re-
sults in the direct impact of the economy reaching sta-
tistical significance at p<0.05 level and still having a 
positive impact. However, the interaction term is posi-
tive and significant implying the impact of the economy 
is conditioned by voter perceptions of responsibility at-
tribution. When the economy was considered to be do-
ing well and the government were perceived to be re-
                                                          
11 We were conscious that the magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance of interaction effects in models with binary dependent 
variables can vary by observation. For robustness, we re-
estimated the interaction using Ai and Norton’s (2003) ap-
proach and found that the significance levels and sign of the 
coefficients to be in same direction as those detailed in our 
analysis. 
sponsible for it, voters were more likely to have sup-
ported the incumbent administration. To gain an idea 
of the magnitude of this effect, Figure 3 (for the 2009 
EP election) and Figure 4 (for the 2014 EP election) 
plots the interaction effect between economy and per-
ception of economic responsibility. Looking at Figure 4, 
the upper right plot indicates that when perception of 
economic responsibility is at the highest level, the 
probability to vote for incumbent government is 
around 60 percent for respondents who thought that 
the economy has improved in the last 12 months prior 
to the election. Yet, for those respondents who were 
more sceptical about the economy, the probability to 
vote for the governing party or coalition drops to 
around 30 percent. However, this difference is not so 
evident when the perception of economic responsibil-
ity is at its lowest (bottom left plot Figure 4).  Here the 
probability to vote for the incumbent party between 
those respondents who answered that economy was 
better was approximately 50 percent compared to 
those who believed that the economy was worse in the 
past 12 months (approximately 40%). 
 
Figure 3. Interaction effect plots between economy and PER for 2009 EP election. Note: The upper right plot indicates 
that PER is at the highest level. The lower left plot indicates that PER is at the lowest level. 
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Figure 4. Interaction effect plots between economy and PER for 2014 EP election. Note: The upper right plot indicates 
that PER is highest. The lower left plot indicates that PER is at the lowest level. 
In sum, we deduce the following from our analysis. 
There is support for H1—the economy had a direct im-
pact on vote choice in 2009. Voter assessments of the 
economy were enough to influence vote choice with 
those perceiving the economic situation to be good 
voting for the incumbent administration and those 
classifying it as worse voting against it. While econom-
ics also mattered in 2014, its impact on vote was condi-
tioned by how much responsibility voters credited to 
the government for economic performance, with the 
more responsibility assigned to the government and 
the better the economic circumstances, the more likely 
voters were to vote for the government. The key point 
though is the direct effect of economy in 2014 was par-
tially channelled through responsibility ascriptions, 
providing support for H2. 
Regarding the impact of the economy and respon-
sibility attribution on vote in 2014, we anticipated this 
effect may not be universal across the EU bloc but that 
it might have differed across countries dependent on 
whether a state had received  a bailout or not. To test 
this, we divided our sample into ‘bailout’ and ‘non-
bailout’ countries and devised two separate logit mod-
els to explore the differences between the two sets of 
nations. We expect in countries that have received a 
financial support from the EU/IMF, we will observe a 
greater level of economic responsibility: the percep-
tions of responsibility will have a stronger and negative 
effect on vote compared to non-bailout countries. This 
is because the economic situation in bailout countries 
was much worse compared to the non-bailout coun-
tries. Therefore, we would expect that the attribution 
of responsibility for the economic circumstances would 
have larger negative effect on the incumbent govern-
ment among bailout countries. 
Our results are detailed in Models V and VI of Table 
3. Perceptions of the state of the economy do not have 
a significant effect on the vote in either set of coun-
tries, which fits with our overall theoretical argument 
that economic voting in 2014 was channelled through 
perceptions of responsibility. Instead, the differences 
between the two sets of countries are seen with re-
spect to the impact of perceptions of responsibility and 
perceptions of responsibility when interacted with 
economic assessments. First, attribution of responsibil-
ity on its own had a significant effect in bailout coun-
tries—when governments were held responsible for 
the performance of the national economy, voters were 
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more likely to vote against it. However, we do not have 
evidence of the same effect taking hold in non-bailout 
countries. We suggest this significant difference re-
flects the poorer state of bailout countries’ economies.  
The interaction effect in both models is positive and 
significant which is line with our expectations—the 
better the economy is and the more governments are 
considered to be responsible, the greater the likelihood 
of voting for the incumbent government. We conclude 
there is support for H3: voters in bailout countries ap-
proached the 2014 elections differently to the non-
bailout. First and foremost, attribution of responsibility 
on its own mattered in these countries, while it did not 
in non-bailout states. Further, the impact of the econ-
omy was conditioned on this basis but also was shown 
to be stronger in bailout countries than non-bailout 
countries. Our overall results show that economic vot-
ing is present in both the 2009 and 2014 EP elections. 
However, this does mask clear differences as to how 
economic voting shaped vote choice between the two 
elections and cross-nationally.  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
While much ink has been spilt exploring the influence 
of economy on the vote in national elections and ref-
erendums, and on attitudes towards European integra-
tion, few studies have analysed the effect of economic 
perceptions on vote in European Parliament elections. 
Yet the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), its 
domination of the political agenda over the past seven 
years, and the fact its marked effects are still very 
much felt, calls for a re-assessment. Our contribution 
explores the economy’s impact in the 2009 and 2014 
contests respectively. 
Our study shows that like other elections, citizens’ 
views about the economy do influence their vote in Eu-
ropean elections. This is somewhat contrary to the 
conclusions of Tilley et al. (2008), who found minimal 
evidence for economic voting, and argued that existing 
political preferences contaminate economic percep-
tions. In a cross-sectional sample, endogeneity is diffi-
cult to rule out but we are confident that convincing 
evidence has been presented which shows that even 
when endogenous concerns can be conclusively ad-
dressed, economic voting exists. Accordingly, we sug-
gest the differences in our findings compared to theirs 
are best explained by the different contexts. The Global 
Financial Crisis and its profound implications on citizens 
have ensured economics has been front and centre of 
the political agenda for the past seven years. As such, it 
became the central preoccupation of citizens and this 
translated into it becoming more important in shaping 
vote choice at the European level. 
However, in line with previous scholarship which 
has found economic voting depends on context (e.g. 
Anderson 2000; Powell Jnr. & Whitten 1993), we found 
economics shaped vote in different ways across the 
two elections. In 2009, with the GFC in its infancy, and 
its consequences becoming gradually apparent, voters, 
many of whom were getting their first opportunity to 
go to the ballot box since the eruption of the crisis, 
were directly motivated by their perceptions of how 
the economy was performing. In 2014, economic per-
ceptions still mattered. However, voter calculus shifted 
and the potency of economic voting depended on how 
much responsibility voters assigned to the national 
government for economic performance. The more re-
sponsibility they felt the government had, the more 
likely economic voting was to take hold. These assess-
ments were seen to be stronger in countries that had 
received external financial assistance in the preceding 
six years, hardly surprising considering the GFCs impact 
on these states was more manifest than others. This 
underlines that economic voting, while prevalent in the 
European context, is conditional both on time and 
space. It also suggests that voters’ response to eco-
nomic crisis evolves, with economic perceptions initial-
ly enough to shape vote choice, but as time goes on, 
economic voting becomes motivated by other consid-
erations including who is deemed to be responsible for 
the circumstances. 
Our study also cast doubt on the idea that the 2014 
European elections were much different compared to 
EP elections of the past, in spite of the characterisation 
of ‘This time it’s different’ (see Hobolt, 2014). For one 
thing, economics mattered in both elections, albeit dif-
ferently. But more fundamentally, voters in both re-
mained strongly motivated by national considerations 
with domestic issues such as national economic per-
ceptions playing a key role. Therefore, we can deduce 
the EP elections remain classic ‘second-order’ contests 
(for similar conclusions see Quinlan & Okolijk, 2016; 
Schmitt & Teperoglou, 2015). 
Interesting avenues of research remain. While our 
study has focused on voters’ ascriptions of economic 
responsibility to national governments, the attributions 
voters ascribe to the European Union remains under-
developed (an exception is Costa-Lobo & Lewis-Beck, 
2012). Additionally, economic voting is multidimen-
sional. Here we have concentrated on the conventional 
valence reward-punishment model but other dimen-
sions merit exploration. Gaining traction is the idea 
that there is a patrimonial aspect to economic voting 
with citizens’ wealth has been found to shape voter 
preferences in Denmark, France, and Portugal (e.g. 
Costa-Lobo, 2013; Stubager, Lewis-Beck, & Nadeau, 
2013). Given its existence at the national level, it might 
be that patrimony also influences voters in European 
contests and future studies should explore this. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Logistic regression results. Source of data: (van Egmond, van der Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & Sapir, 2013; Schmitt, 
Popa, & Devinger, 2015) 
Governing Party or Coalition (1) 
2009 
(2) 
2014 
(3) 
2009 
(4) 
2014 
Economy 0.67** 
(0.054) 
0.797** 
(0.05) 
0.677** 
(0.142) 
0.031 
( 0.165) 
PER - - -0.052** 
(0.007) 
-0.06** 
(0.013) 
Ideology distance -0.253** 
(0.009) 
-0.069** 
(0.013) 
-0.256** 
(0.01) 
-0.071** 
(0.013) 
Religion -0.084** 
(0.011) 
-0.054** 
(0.017) 
-0.086** 
(0.011) 
-0.055** 
(0.017) 
Economy x PER - - -0.004 
(0.02) 
0.099** 
(0.02) 
Constant -0.146** 
(0.053) 
-0.164 
(0.088) 
0.243** 
(0.072) 
0.303* 
(0.138) 
N 19878 6850 19498 6790 
Log Likelihood -10788 -4571.8 -10540.2 -4516.1 
AIC 21584 9151.6 21092 9044.2 
Note: Standard error in parenthesis; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
Table A2. Summary statistics. 
2009 N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Gov. Party 27.069 0.249 0.432 0 1 
Economy 23.088 0.085 0.278 0 1 
PER 26.264 7.188 2.717 0 10 
Ideology distance 23.647 2.738 2.128 0.022 8.959 
Religion 26.549 4.181 1.572 1 6 
2014 N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Gov. Party 13.701 0.454 0.498 0 1 
Economy 17.828 0.436 0.496 0 1 
PER 28.324 7.668 2.630 0 10 
Ideology distance 22.699 2.82 2.017 0.013 9.02 
Religion 28.475 4.383 1.445 1 6 
Bailout/Non-Bailout 28.986 0.28/0.72 0.449 0 1 
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Table A3. Summary statistics of economy variable by country 2009. 
Country N Mean Sd Median Min Max 
Austria 875 0.05 0.23 0 0 1 
Belgium 732 0.14 0.35 0 0 1 
Bulgaria 768 0.12 0.33 0 0 1 
Cyprus 747 0.16 0.37 0 0 1 
Czech Republic 785 0.11 0.32 0 0 1 
Denmark 868 0.11 0.32 0 0 1 
Estonia 954 0.03 0.16 0 0 1 
Finland 902 0.03 0.17 0 0 1 
France 900 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Germany 898 0.08 0.26 0 0 1 
Greece 775 0.1 0.29 0 0 1 
Hungary 909 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Ireland 942 0.06 0.24 0 0 1 
Italy 782 0.1 0.3 0 0 1 
Latvia 966 0.01 0.08 0 0 1 
Lithuania 937 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 
Luxembourg 849 0.08 0.28 0 0 1 
Malta 808 0.07 0.26 0 0 1 
Poland 758 0.11 0.32 0 0 1 
Portugal 816 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 
Romania 860 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
Slovakia 870 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
Slovenia 923 0.05 0.21 0 0 1 
Spain 850 0.17 0.37 0 0 1 
Sweden 876 0.13 0.33 0 0 1 
The Netherlands 873 0.09 0.28 0 0 1 
United Kingdom 865 0.18 0.38 0 0 1 
Table A4. Summary statistics of economy variable by country 2014. 
Country N Mean Sd Median Min Max 
Austria 693 0.4 0.49 0 0 1 
Belgium 670 0.5 0.5 1 0 1 
Bulgaria 620 0.14 0.34 0 0 1 
Cyprus 366 0.39 0.49 0 0 1 
Czech Republic 620 0.46 0.5 0 0 1 
Denmark 805 0.94 0.24 1 0 1 
Estonia 616 0.47 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 727 0.13 0.33 0 0 1 
France 760 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 
Germany 868 0.74 0.44 1 0 1 
Greece 775 0.13 0.34 0 0 1 
Hungary 593 0.52 0.5 1 0 1 
Ireland 751 0.72 0.45 1 0 1 
Italy 833 0.04 0.19 0 0 1 
Latvia 607 0.48 0.5 0 0 1 
Lithuania 572 0.57 0.5 1 0 1 
Luxembourg 316 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
Malta 382 0.74 0.44 1 0 1 
Poland 568 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 
Portugal 636 0.23 0.42 0 0 1 
Romania 674 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 
Slovakia 562 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 
Slovenia 772 0.25 0.43 0 0 1 
Spain 669 0.34 0.47 0 0 1 
Sweden 607 0.69 0.46 1 0 1 
The Netherlands 784 0.8 0.4 1 0 1 
United Kingdom 982 0.68 0.47 1 0 1 
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Table A5. Multilevel logit models examining the impact of economic voting in 27 democracies “about the same” is 
negative in the economy variable. Source: van Egmond, van der Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & Sapir, 2013; Schmitt, Popa, & 
Devinger, 2015. 
Dependent variable: Vote for 
incumbent govt. 
(I) 
2009 
(II) 
2014 
(III) 
2009 
(IV) 
2014 
FIXED EFFECTS     
Economy 0.633*** 
(0.098) 
0.833*** 
(0.165) 
0.7*** 
(0.169) 
0.373* 
(0.222) 
PER - - -0.039*** 
(0.006) 
-0.033*** 
(0.01) 
Ideology distance -0.277*** 
(0.009) 
-0.067*** 
(0.011) 
-0.278*** 
(0.01) 
-0.067*** 
(0.011) 
Religion -0.116*** 
(0.011) 
-0.062*** 
(0.016) 
-0.119*** 
(0.011) 
-0.063*** 
(0.016) 
Economy x PER - - -0.011 
(0.021) 
0.06*** 
(0.019) 
Constant 0.017 
(0.123) 
0.013 
(0.151) 
0.313** 
(0.131) 
0.271 
(0.17) 
RANDOM EFFECTS     
Intercept Country by Economy 0.079 
(0.28) 
0.323 
(0.568) 
0.075 
(0.274) 
0.315 
(0.562) 
Intercept Country 0.255 
(0.505) 
0.116 
(0.34) 
0.255 
(0.505) 
0.121 
(0.348) 
N (Micro/Macro) 23076/27 10702/27 22607/27 10603 
Log Likelihood -12188.2 -6796.3 -11897.8 -6720.7 
AIC 24388.3 13604.6 23811.6 13457.4 
BIC 24436.6 13648.3 23875.8 13515.5 
Note: Standard error in parenthesis; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; * **p<0.01. 
Table A6. Multilevel logit models examining the impact of economic voting in 27 democracies “about the same” is 
positive in the economy variable. Source: van Egmond, van der Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & Sapir, 2013; Schmitt, Popa, & 
Devinger, 2015. 
Dependent variable: Vote for 
incumbent govt. 
(I) 
2009 
(II) 
2014 
(III) 
2009 
(IV) 
2014 
FIXED EFFECTS     
Economy 0.487*** 
(0.09) 
0.861*** 
(0.139) 
0.539*** 
(0.131) 
0.62** 
(0.197) 
PER - - -0.036*** 
(0.007) 
-0.04** 
(0.015) 
Ideology distance -0.27*** 
(0.009) 
-0.069*** 
(0.011) 
-0.272*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.011) 
Religion -0.116*** 
(0.011) 
-0.066*** 
(0.016) 
-0.119*** 
(0.011) 
-0.067*** 
(0.016) 
Economy x PER - - -0.009 
(0.014) 
0.032* 
(0.018) 
Constant -0.072 
(0.124) 
-0.305* 
(0.161) 
0.204 
(0.134) 
0.004 
(0.197) 
RANDOM EFFECTS     
Intercept Country by Economy 0.086 
(0.293) 
0.216 
(0.465) 
0.085 
(0.292) 
0.213 
(0.462) 
Intercept Country 0.25 
(0.5) 
0.272 
(0.522) 
0.248 
(0.498) 
0.275 
(0.524) 
N (Micro/Macro) 23076/27 10702 22607 10603/27 
Log Likelihood -12147.7 -6814.5 -11860.8 -6740.6 
AIC 24307.4 13641.0 23737.5 13497.2 
BIC 24355.6 13684.6 23801.7 13555.4 
Note: Standard error in parenthesis; *p<0.1; **p<0.05;* **p<0.01. 
 
 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 145-166 163 
Table A7. Multilevel logit models examining the impact of economic voting in 27 democracies, dependent variable: 
Vote for the Head of government party. Source: van Egmond, van der Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & Sapir, 2013; Schmitt, 
Popa, & Devinger, 2015. 
Dependent variable: Vote for the 
Head of government party  
(I) 
2009 
(II) 
2014 
(III) 
2009 
(IV) 
2014 
FIXED EFFECTS     
Economy 0.84** 
(0.15) 
1.085** 
(0.173) 
0.85** 
(0.243) 
0.523* 
(0.265) 
PER - - -0.039** 
(0.011) 
-0.045* 
(0.019) 
Ideology - distance -0.417** 
(0.015) 
-0.626** 
(0.022) 
-0.419** 
(0.015) 
-0.627** 
(0.022) 
Religion -0.108** 
(0.017) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
-0.111** 
(0.017) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
Economy x PER - - -0.004 
(0.029) 
0.073** 
(0.026) 
Constant -0.364 
(0.438) 
-0.146 
(0.226) 
-0.066 
(0.442) 
0.196 
(0.269) 
RANDOM EFFECTS     
Intercept Economy by Country 0.178 
(0.421) 
0.319 
(0.565) 
0.164 
(0.406) 
0.303 
(0.551) 
Intercept Country 4.676 
(2.162) 
0.65 
(0.807) 
4.607 
(2.146) 
0.663 
(0.814) 
N (Micro/Macro) 12143/27 7916/27 11967/27 7865/27 
Log Likelihood -5266.7 -3524.7 -5166.6 -3495.5 
AIC 10545.3 7061.4 10349.1 7007.0 
BIC 10589.7 7103.2 10408.2 7062.8 
Note: Standard error in parenthesis; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
Table A8. Multilevel logit models examining the impact of economic voting in 27 democracies, Ideology independent 
variable. Source: van Egmond, van der Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & Sapir, 2013; Schmitt, Popa, & Devinger, 2015. 
Dependent variable: Vote for 
incumb. govt. 
(I) 
2009 
(II) 
2014 
(III) 
2009 
(IV) 
2014 
FIXED EFFECTS     
Economy 0.763** 
(0.134) 
1.214** 
(0.2) 
0.819** 
(0.19) 
0.615* 
(0.256) 
PER - - -0.04** 
(0.007) 
-0.041** 
(0.014) 
Ideology 0.073** 
(0.007) 
-0.046** 
(0.009) 
0.074** 
(0.007) 
-0.046** 
(0.009) 
Religion -0.102** 
(0.012) 
-0.045* 
(0.019) 
-0.106** 
(0.012) 
-0.041* 
(0.02) 
Economy x PER - - -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.078** 
(0.021) 
Constant -1.208** 
(0.133) 
-0.387* 
(0.185) 
-0.903** 
(0.142) 
-0.094 
(0.215) 
RANDOM EFFECTS     
Intercept Economy by Country 0.192 
(0.438) 
0.484 
(0.695) 
0.184 
(0.429) 
0.477 
(0.69) 
Intercept Country 0.159 
(0.399) 
0.113 
(0.337) 
0.167 
(0.408) 
0.112 
(0.335) 
N (Micro/Macro) 19924/27 7916/27 19583/27 7865/27 
Log Likelihood -10624.7 -4881.2 -10407.6 -4844.1 
AIC 21261.5 9774.4 20831.2 9704.2 
BIC 21308.9 9816.2 20894.3 9760.0 
Note: Standard error in parenthesis; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
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Table A9. Multilevel logit models examining the impact of economic voting in 27 democracies for 2009 and 2014 EP 
elections. Source: van Egmond, van der Brug, Hobolt, Franklin, & Sapir, 2013; Schmitt, Popa, & Devinger, 2015. 
Dependent variable: Vote for the incumbent gov. (I) 
Pooled model 
FIXED EFFECTS  
Economy 0.845** 
(0.196) 
PER -0.039** 
(0.007) 
2014 0.587** 
(0.127) 
Ideology distance -0.197** 
(0.008) 
Religion -0.102** 
(0.011) 
Economy x PER -0.007 
(0.02) 
Economy x 2014 -0.297 
(0.229) 
PER x 2014 -0.001 
(0.016) 
Economy x PER x 2014 0.076* 
(0.03) 
Constant -0.031 
(0.132) 
RANDOM EFFECTS  
Intercept Economy by Country 0.226 
(0.475) 
Intercept Country 0.108 
(0.328) 
N (Micro/Macro) 26288/27 
Log Likelihood -14389.0 
AIC 28801.9 
BIC 28900.1 
Note: Standard error in parenthesis; *p<0.05; **p<0.01. 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of economy by country for 2009.
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Figure A2. Distribution of economy by country for 2014. 
 
Figure A3. Interaction effect plots between economy and PER among Bailout countries for 2014 EP election. Note: The 
upper right plot indicates that PER is at the highest level. The lower left plot indicates that PER is at the lowest level. 
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Figure A4. Interaction effect plots between economy and PER among non-bailout countries for 2014 EP election. Note: 
The upper right plot indicates that PER is at the highest level. The lower left plot indicates that PER is at the lowest 
level. 
 
